CfP

For centuries, and still quite recently, emotions and associated bodily life have been dismissed and disqualified, just as much in the history of philosophy (from Plato to Descartes and Kant) as in theoretical scientific contexts (in the still dominant computational approaches), but also in the prevailing accounts of social and political interactions. The argument is that emotions and lived bodies concern only our private subjective life and do not entail any objective validity. In contrast, from early on phenomenology paved the way for the recognition of subjectivity as embodied and emotionally laden. Contemporary scientific researches also illustrate the importance of embodied emotions and their impact in the learning of knowledge and in the development of sciences. Thus, emotions are no longer relegated to confused, chaotic, false states of mind submitted to error-prediction, e.g. to the failure of an expected event to occur. They are not epiphenomena any longer only operating on the inessential surface of our reason and unaffecting it, but lie at the core of human beings, at the very core of all of our relations. We invite scholars to submit contributions that tackle the issue of the phenomenology of emotions, understood in their existential dimensions, and also connected to the embodied dimension of subjectivity.